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The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of
the Longer-Range Future was established at
Boston University in late 2000 to advance scholarly
dialogue and investigation into the future. The over-
arching mission of the Pardee Center is to serve as
a leading academic nucleus for the study of the
longer-range future and to produce serious intellectual work that is interdisci-
plinary, international, non-ideological, and of practical applicability towards the
betterment of human well-being and enhancement of the human condition.
The Pardee Center’s Conference Series provides an ongoing platform for such
investigation. The Center convenes a conference each year, relating the topics
to one another, so as to assemble a master-construct of expert research,
opinion, agreement, and disagreement over the years to come. To help build
an institutional memory, the Center encourages select participants to attend
most or all of the conferences. Conference participants look at decisions that
will have to be made and at options among which it will be necessary to
choose. The results of these deliberations provide the springboard for the
development of new scenarios and strategies. 
The following is an edited version of our conference presentations.
To view our conference proceedings in their entirety, visit us on the Web
at www.bu.edu/pardee. 
Frederick S. Pardee
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Session One
S E S S I O N  O N E
A view that goes back to fifth-century Greece is that government should be the
teacher and that citizens should serve the state. An opposite Founding Fathers
concept is that the state and government should provide a matrix of security
within which each individual can pursue his/her goals. Now civil society advo-
cates argue for a third term: some sort of devotion by the individual to finding
self-fulfillment by combining with others, in non-governmental organizations
and institutions. Which way does/should the future go?
Amitai Etzioni
The Centrality of Society
It is important to specify the historical context in which we live so that our
analyses and new ideas can serve as correctives to previous biases built into the
social system. For example, the endless debate whether the United States is a
Lockean country with room for both civil and Republican virtues assumes that
there is a tension between the two. Arguing for a reduction in community values
today would be a different undertaking than in the markedly different circum-
stances of colonial America. Many of my colleagues who write about civil society,
individual freedom, and such, haven’t really discovered the twenty-first century.
In many ways they are still looking backwards as they quote Isaiah Berlin.
Berlin, obsessed with twentieth-century totalitarianism, was concerned with lim-
iting the power of society so that individuals could have as many choices as pos-
sible. Historical circumstances change sometimes because of the moral vacuum
that has been created by the successful attack on existing values and traditions.
Liberal and communitarian thinking divides on the question of whether
ideas of social good should result from shared formulations. Fundamentalism in
all its forms attempts to provide meaning to life in immoderate, illiberal ways. A
fault line separates modernity and fundamentalism since no third body of ethics
bridges the gap. We need a moderate ethic that is tolerant, inclusive, and based
on moral dialogue, not coercion. Debate, no longer confined to intra-social con-
versation, but ranging over all of global society, will bring divisions to the sur-
face that are not consensus-driven and lack an ethical standpoint.
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4Modern relativism was a historical reaction to a philosophy that claimed 
the authority of a superior white, European civilization. While this was a useful
correction, we have gone too far in the other direction and must now search for
new, shared ethical foundations. The old Tocquevillean argument that the state
should protect individuals from itself is a thin, contentless notion and is no
longer sufficient. A good society must have some notion of what is good, which
should be based on moral dialogue rather than imposition by force.
In certain ways moral dialogue contrasts with the liberal notion of reason
and cool deliberation based on facts and the rules of logical discussion. It allows
us to come to that place of fear we need to occupy if we are to engage genuinely
in normative conflicts. We also need to reconsider the ideal of keeping values
confined to the private sphere. On the contrary, moral dialogue requires us to
engage our deepest values and bring them to the table. The simplistic distinction
between private and public morality can no longer serve us in a world where peo-
ple care deeply about things that happen in private. 
On the other hand, such dialogue does not necessarily lead to cultural wars.
There are many national and international examples of successfully resolved
moral dialogues. Initial disagreement can be emotional and impassioned, but
after a few years the dust settles and a new shared understanding and formula-
tion of the good arises as people changed their own understanding and commit-
ments without government interference. This is the case in changed public
support of environmentalist ideals. Shared values resulting from moral dialogue
have the advantage of being largely self-enforcing. They require a great deal of
preparation for their evolution. On the other hand, laws that are enacted without
moral dialogue preceding them will be met with resistance and require constant
policing and enforcement.  
Moral dialogue keeps us involved in a good community by keeping things
simple. Most of the time we do not need theocracy, morality squads, and policing
to make us do what is right. Men and women are social animals, profoundly
dependent on the approval of their fellow human beings. Communitarian ideals
encourage us to be nobler than we otherwise would be. The internal sense of
community frowns on people who don’t live up to their obligations and applauds
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Session One
them when they do. This is what we mean by a social fabric. It is a measure of
community and can lead to a fairly high level of social order without the neces-
sity of extensive state intervention and coercion.
Robert Jackson
Response 
Professor Etzioni, who is a sociologist, thinks about these problems from the
point of view of society. I tend to look at the world domestically and internation-
ally, from the point of view of political and legal thought. Professor Etzioni
adopts a communitarian point of view, in which the group has the prominent
place in society. More than a voluntary association of free individuals, the group
is also a moral order in which the individual cannot be as free as he is in tradi-
tional liberal theory. I have considerable sympathy for this point of view, which
was shared by Edmund Burke, who extolled the virtues of the little platoon over
the big battalions and insisted on the positive value of tradition. He conceived of
the state as a partnership of the living, the dead, and those yet to be born whose
values are transmitted over generations. Professor Etzioni’s paper criticizes the
classical liberal view that attempts to preserve the rights of the individual by
reducing the social constrictions of communities and institutions. In his view, 
it is dangerous when these institutions weaken, because then neither the state
nor the market can function properly.
I have some questions about this position.  First: are there other perspec-
tives we can adopt to deal with these questions?  For example, can we conceive 
of a stable, orderly, and safe society without an overarching system of authority?
Conservative thinkers like Burke, Locke, and Hobbes deny this possibility, and,
on the whole, I agree with them. Second: although moral conduct and notions 
of right and wrong are surely learned in a social context, can society itself be
understood coherently as a moral agent? Only individuals and corporate persons
have responsibilities. Societies as such do not. Is it not more profitable to un-
derstand society as a sphere of human relations, where individuals engage in
mutual relations under the protection of a state operating under the rule of law?
Third: virtue is a disposition learned primarily in societies to engage in conduct
795047_layout-2  12/10/07  3:31 PM  Page 5
6with good consequences. But because vicious people live among the virtuous, 
we surrender some of our freedom to the state. Moreover, the state can play an
important role in inculcating some virtues that are appropriate to citizenship, 
as is the case of the military. Fourth: law in a good society is an extension of
morality which applies to all members. Insofar as it creates a space for people 
to enter into social relations with each other, law is above society. Fifth: although
the political has historically been undergirt by the social, it may be possible to
have a society without a state under which it exists and flourishes. 
Two final general comments. First: the communitarian vision de-emphasizes
and blurs the distinction between public and private. The clarity of this distinc-
tion in legal and political thought, however, is an achievement over previous
medieval thinking when authority was multiple, ambiguous, and overlapping.
The modern state is a solution to this problem. In overlooking this achievement,
much contemporary communitarism is regressive. Second: I have had consider-
able experience in Africa, where the notion of the state has largely failed. People
seek what refuge they can find in little enclaves, although they can find little
security there compared to that offered by more enduring states.
Reply by Amitai Etzioni:
In these matters we always deal with state and society. The primary question 
is what we should do when the state becomes too powerful. In Iran virtue is
enforced by state power rather than by moral discussion and persuasion. When
there is deviation from community norms, we have a choice of calling the police
or trying to stimulate the moral juice of a community. We need both resources,
but we always have to decide which is the first and the second line of defense
against lawlessness. Society can be an agent in these processes, not in the sense
that it is a free-acting, freethinking individual, but insofar as it can exercise an
independent force.
On the other hand, the community cannot always be the ultimate arbiter
of what is right. Communities can act malignantly and destructively. Some
consensus can be horrible, even when it has arisen out of moral dialogue. We
therefore have to think about what criteria such consensus should be based
on. The Constitution of the United States or the UN Declaration of Human
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Rights rests on criteria that we can bring to bear even against those semi-
sacred documents. There are some absolute values out there, which we can
talk about freely. Self-evident truths can sometimes be hidden, but they
emerge when we engage in free conversations.
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In the past, as realists have taught, countries have by and large pursued their
own particular interests in international relations: their own independence,
their own security, their own prosperity, and the like. Now science and technol-
ogy have enlarged the scale on which things happen, so that many interests are
shared by two or more countries in common, or by whole regions or the entire
globe. Will the ambit of common interests continue to expand at the expense of
the narrow and selfish national ones? In the longer-range future, will the teach-
ings of realism become obsolete?
David Fromkin
Roosevelt’s Vision: Values in International Relations: Past and
Future
Writing my paper after September 11 while preparing a course on world his-
tory, I came to the fall of the Roman Empire, of Constantinople and the barbar-
ians at the gate, which recalled something that we all know but often forget: in
history nothing is inevitable.  Globalization, trends towards higher levels of tech-
nology, and more sophisticated communication will probably continue into the
future. My subject, foreign policy goals, is changing. The very ways we look at
international relations may have to change.
International relations is an infant study. The first widely used textbook by
Schumann came out in the thirties. In the forties and fifties, classes in interna-
tional relations were offered, and now we have whole departments devoted to the
study. Nevertheless it is still a relatively new subject. Quarrels that began at its ori-
gins between the two schools of idealists and realists, such as how states should
act as opposed to how they in fact do act, have not been resolved or superseded. 
Many realists claim international affairs make sense because states are
motivated by the same considerations, principally by power. The idealist school,
which takes its inspiration from Woodrow Wilson, argues that the actions of
countries can be affected by debate, argumentation and, above all, public opin-
ion. Robert Cecil, chief British protagonist for the League of Nations, told the
House of Commons that the Covenant of the League was based on the ability of
public opinion to affect the behavior of nations. He said if we’re wrong about
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that, we’re wrong about everything. Realists like myself have come to agree with
him. He was wrong about everything.
Idealists believe that a public morality can be debated and that countries
can be persuaded to accept it as a guide for conduct. Realists like Hans
Morgenthau, on the other hand, believe that countries are intent on pursuing
their own national interests as defined by power relationships. His analysis, by
adhering to one standard, allows us to discuss international relations systemati-
cally. Idealists, on the other hand, argue that we make progress in international
relations through teaching people that there are no real clashes of interest or
irreconcilable differences between nations. Realists disagree and insist on the
real motivational differences. For them, the answer involves the recognition of the
integrity of one’s opponents’ interests, even though they differ from one’s own. 
The international situation has been changed by a major new category of
debate about interests that are common to all nations. The clearest relate to the
environment and are bigger than those of any particular state. Pursuing such
goals requires an internationalist, globalist outlook and the willingness to make
decisions on a wider scale than existing state systems. The crucial distinction is
no longer between national interests, but between them and larger, global, com-
mon interests. The great problem is how we are to deal with those problems with-
out having a world state.
James Chace
Response
I question the adequacy of idealism for understanding international affairs. 
I also agree with Professor Fromkin’s warning that America is neither strong
enough nor wise enough to provide political direction for people of other cul-
tures. I would like to have heard him further discuss whether an ethical dimen-
sion can be linked to the realist paradigm.
For Roosevelt, the Common Interest was a future with certain goals like
compulsory education, immunization against disease, and universal birth con-
trol. Now, fifty years later, we are witnessing a new emphasis on moral dimen-
sions in international politics. This may result in a sense of shared values among
795047_layout-2  12/10/07  3:31 PM  Page 9
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the most powerful countries and a united effort to impose a peaceful settlement
on unruly regions of the world, as was the case in Europe in the forty years that
followed the Congress of Vienna. This agreement of purpose occurred even
though the two most liberal powers, England and France, had serious ideological
differences with the autocratic powers of Russia, Austria, and Prussia. 
Could the US, working with the EU, Russia, and China, find the common
ground needed to prevent conflict among nations, especially in instances where
violence does not arise from the ambitions of an individual state but from terror-
ist activities that cross national borders? The eradication of terrorism could be
viewed as part of the national interest of a wide range of powers. There are
already treaties that support an international criminal court, a mechanism for
cleaning up the environment, as well as those that forbid atomic testing or curb
biological warfare. As long as countries remain independent, they will make
their own decisions. The US has been foremost in insisting on its national sover-
eignty. Were we to link our national interest to common international interests,
we might shape a different world in the twenty-first century. But unless this shift
in attitude is formulated in a way that seems to support our national interests, it
is unlikely to come into being. 
The consensus after 1815 saw stability and moderation as consistent with
national interests, but such an agreement also linked the balance of power to a
moral consensus. Hamilton warned against “idle theories which have amused us
with promises of an exception from the imperfection, weaknesses and evils inci-
dent to society of every shape.” He also reminded us that “we as well as the other
inhabitants of the globe are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom
and perfect virtue.”
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Reply by David Fromkin:
In most clashes with the common interest, the national interest tends to prevail.
In an ideal world, where world community has its own form, that tendency might
be overcome by what Professor Etzioni calls a hierarchy of loyalties. But we are a
long way from that ideal. Our primary loyalty is presently to the US, not to the
human race.
The possibility of all great powers working together is difficult to imagine
because only a few countries share broad commonalities with us. Consequently
their willingness to act with the US is quite limited. We probably will have to
work with overlapping alliances rather than with one sort of grand alliance of
the major powers.
The closest analogy to the problem of terrorism I can think of is the histori-
cal problem of piracy, which had almost universally been considered a crime
against all nations. Nevertheless, piracy was exterminated almost always by one
nation acting unilaterally rather than in an alliance. It would be wonderful if a
broad alliance emerged out of our war against terrorism, but I doubt that it will
happen.
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S E S S I O N  T H R E E
Will our classics be classics in the future as values continue to evolve? The open
society described in Pericles’ Funeral Oration, and the examples of the ancient
Greek and Roman democracies, inspired the Founding Fathers and the British,
American, and French revolutions; but they are questioned even today, and not
only by non-Western countries. Will the old Mediterranean classics speak to the
condition of the year 2100 or 2200? What if nobody at that time reads Greek or
Latin? To what extent will an evolved Christianity provide alternatives to pagan
classical values?
Roger Kimball
Does Pericles Point the Way?
We study the past not only for antiquarian interests, but to inform ourselves
about future alternatives. We learn how tyranny masquerades as virtue and
inhumanity cloaks itself in righteousness. Teaching us about our current situa-
tion, the past tells us how to deal with the future. I would like to focus on two
issues. The first is the issue of novelty in history. The second is whether Pericles
does provide a guide for the future. 
I am struck by the amount of optimism that language intrudes into our
scholarly efforts. A center dedicated to the study of the longer-range future is
necessarily an institution conceived in hope and dedicated to a relatively cheer-
ful view of mankind’s destiny. Such hope insinuates itself into our plans and
projects. What a nugget of optimism is contained in “the foreseeable future.” We
often forget how even the most prudent ways of conducting our life require stu-
pendous acts of faith. Had I been asked on September 10 if the Twin Towers
would continue standing for “the foreseeable future,” I would have answered yes.
Foresight cannot accommodate that most pedestrian of eventualities, an event.
We continue to make plans and lay contingencies, but find ourselves constantly
surprised by historical events. On September 10 it seemed unlikely that a band 
of murderous fanatics could fundamentally alter the political landscape of the
world. 
In endowing the unlikely with a pedigree of explanation, we attempt to neu-
tralize novelty and extract the unexpected from what actually did occur. Today
we are now finding the events of September 11 almost inevitable. We had plausi-
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Session Three
ble explanations and warnings then, but they lacked the traction that events give
to hindsight. We did not consider them part of the foreseeable future until the
future overtook us. Will our classics continue to function as classics even as our
values continue to evolve? 
If classics cease to be classics, we will have changed for the worse beyond
recognition. In my view, however, values do not change in themselves so much 
as they change keys. Our underlying humanity, with its needs and aspirations,
remains constant. Before we ask whether Pericles points the way, we first need 
to know what Pericles stood for. His deservedly famous speech commemorating
those who fell in the first of 27 years of the Peloponnesian War celebrates
Athenian democracy, which was not merely a political arrangement, but a way 
of life. It required two keystones—both freedom and tolerance, and responsible
behavior and attention to duties. 
Pericles said, “We Athenians are free and tolerant in our private lives, but in
our public affairs we keep to the law... including those unwritten laws... of taste,
manners and morals, which it is an acknowledged shame to break.” A society
where manners continue to be central and important is healthier than one in
which manners have broken down and which requires the intervention of the law
to preserve order. From the perspective of modern America, democracy in Athens
seems limited and imperfect in the way it excluded women from citizenship and
maintained a large slave class, but Athens did formulate an ideal of equality
before the law, where membership in a particular class did not matter as much
as men’s actual abilities. 
Life in Athens was free and full. Pericles often stresses the importance of
sound judgment and moral balance. Culture and the life of the mind were the
ennoblements of life, not an escape from its burdens or a mere decadent pastime.
The common stake that all citizens had in the commonwealth of the city brought
responsibilities with it as well as privileges. 
When everyone is clamoring for his or her rights, it is worth remembering
that every right carries a corresponding duty. Today, the word democracy is often
used as a synonym for mediocrity. For Pericles, democracy did not necessarily
entangle people in mediocrity. Athenian freedom was, above all, the freedom to
795047_layout-2  12/10/07  3:31 PM  Page 13
14
excel, a view of society and the individual, which, though rooted in tradition, was
oriented toward the future.
Athenian ideals of freedom and tolerance were not inevitable developments,
but the results of choice. They have proven peculiarly powerful in the West when
they were absorbed by Christendom in the eighteenth century and helped to
inform the democratic principles that undergirt British and American democ-
racy. We must, however, remember that alternative visions are capable of inspir-
ing allegiance. September 11 was an attack on the idea of a liberal, democratic
society. Many illusions were shattered, including the fantasies of academic mul-
ticulturalists. Pericles, a dead, white male if ever there was one, embodied in his
life and aspirations an ideal of humanity completely at odds with academic mul-
ticulturalists, who insist that all cultures are of equal worth. 
Another illusion that was shattered is the feeling that the world is basically
a benevolent, freedom-loving place, if only people had enough education, safe
sex, and National Public Radio. This utopian vision was encouraged by America’s
fortunate geographical position and our extraordinary growth of wealth and mil-
itary power. But increased international mobility and the dissemination of tech-
nological know-how have conspired to neutralize these advantages. We now have
enemies we cannot hide from, placate, or negotiate with.
A third shattered illusion concerns the morality of power. Trendy academics,
CNN commentators, and other armchair utopians pretend that the exercise of
power by the powerful is evil by definition, while violence on the part of anyone
else is attributed to the frustration and rage directed against the unjust exercise
of power. We learned in Somalia and in attacks on the US throughout the Middle
East that power unsupported by resolution will be perceived as weakness, and
that weakness will provoke a challenge. 
All this changed with September 11, but we are already hearing voices not of
caution, but of weariness, impatience, and insularity. These voices must be resis-
ted if freedom is to continue to thrive. A liberal democratic polity is based on the
force provided by economic might and military prowess. Bagehot wrote that
“History is strewn with the wrecks of nations which have gained a little progres-
siveness at the cost of a great deal of hard manliness, and have thus prepared
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Session Three
themselves for destruction as soon as the movements of the world give a chance
for it.” This sounds like Pericles, who does point the way into the future. The
question is whether we will follow him.
Mark Danner
Response
Many of today’s arguments raged in the eighties and nineties. We have a long way
to go before we will understand exactly what happened on September 11. I do not
believe that it was an attack on the idea of America as a liberal society. The
people who carried out this attack had very specific goals in mind. They see the
American presence in the Gulf as propping up regimes with whom they have
strong cultural, ideological, and political quarrels. They subsequently located
weaknesses in these regimes and American society. The historical overview
offered in some of the papers today gives a remarkably selective view of that
period’s history. The present crisis does not begin with Somalia, but with Lebanon
in 1983, or the famous retreat from the rooftop of the Saigon embassy. Saddam
Hussein famously said that Americans are not willing to lose ten thousand dead
in combat. The remark sounded ridiculous then, but it does not any longer. Why
have the historical accounts we have heard today not begun that far back?
Today’s discussion is not merely an argument among intellectuals, but says
something profound about American society and its willingness to act in the
world. It involves the ability and willingness of American leaders to use politi-
cal capital to build up, support, and take military action in countries when they
believe the situation requires it. That is a deeply rooted historical and political
issue that involves both political parties. When bin Laden and his type try to
persuade the American people that it is too expensive to stay in the Gulf and
support certain regimes, they perceive in us a lack of forbearance. 
The problems we must confront are deeper than most people suggest. The
illusions that were supposedly shattered by September 11 were in many ways
mere wishful thinking. The problem here is not with Susan Sontag or Edward
Said and other commentators from the left. The main attacks on American pol-
icy in the Gulf so far have come from the right. There is no dialogue with the left.
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The government itself fears that it will not have the strength, forbearance, and
will to make the electorate understand what the war is about and to support pro-
tracted and large losses. Dead white European males and multiculturalism are
provocative, but they do not have much to do with September 11.
In his account of Periclean Athens, Thucydides stressed moderation and the
risks of overextension, showing how certain domestic values contradict them-
selves when they are applied in an imperium. This has been a problem in the US,
especially since the Truman Doctrine of 1947. Thinking about Pericles lets us see
the contradictions of a democracy acting like an empire. We see this in Saudi
Arabia, where the stakes are very high.
The playwright David Mamet is interested in con games, especially in the
moment when the mark realizes he is being taken. He turns for help to the author-
ities, but finds that they have been part of the con all along. Since September 11,
the country has been laboring under the illusion that it is reacting appropriately.
But as the war continues, risks in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia point to contradic-
tions in our own political culture. Pericles would have recognized them, but his
message would have been different from what we are hearing today.
Reply by Roger Kimball: 
These problems go back further than September 11. We should have responded
more strongly to the first attacks on American installations, but the past few
administrations did not undertake a response. I agree that the multiculturalist
claim that all cultures are equal is a pernicious idea that has been shaken by
September 11. The conviction that the world is a benevolent place is also an illu-
sion, but of a different order.
Mark Danner:
There was no recent political support for staying in Somalia, Haiti, or Rwanda.
All important voices ridiculed the idea as a desperate attempt on the part of
Clinton to stay in office after the details of the Lewinsky scandal became public.
The political constellation that urges the use of force has changed dramatically.
The far left has been marginalized. 
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S E S S I O N  F O U R
Huntington’s “civilizations” that (he predicts) will clash are almost all religions.
Will scientific modernism prove to be a civilization of its own, perhaps at odds
with religion, and therefore breaking cleanly with the past?  For science, all
truth is provisional, and the role of humans is to ask questions; for religion, the
answers are known and humans should not question but instead should have
faith. Will the future see a conflict between science and all religions? Is there
room for both?
John Silber, Presider
Introduction
Issues of collectivization and homogeneity rise whenever we consider global cap-
italism. In only a few years the US, by means of the free market economy, has
managed to collectivize its farms more thoroughly than Lenin and Stalin could
ever have. Similar trends in retail trade and mass entertainment in France and
Germany suggest that this is a result of American cultural hegemony. We wonder
what consequences follow these developments.
Ambassador Charles Stith
Moral Values and Market Values in an Era of Global Capitalism
The globalization of capitalism is a fact of life and will continue to define our
reality for the foreseeable future. In light of September 11, it is especially impor-
tant to humanize capitalism if we are to mitigate the despair and discontent that
give rise to terrorist fanaticism. To accomplish that task we need to determine
what values are needed to sustain our economic and common life in an era of
global capitalism.
My thinking about this issue was stimulated by George Soros’s The Crisis of
Global Capitalism. His central point is twofold: (i) any country that wishes to
develop its economy has to kowtow to Western capital markets or be relegated to
the dregs of the world marketplace; and (ii) despite the universality of capital-
ism, we still have not developed a universal set of values, reconcilable with mar-
ket values, that can sustain our common life in this global economy.
One of my primary interests as director of the African Presidential Archives
and Research Center is looking at policies that will encourage the economies of
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countries that are trying to reorganize their economies along free market lines.
I also dealt with the same issues when I was Ambassador to Tanzania. In both
capacities we considered how integrating Africa into the global economy repre-
sented good market policy as well as good moral policy. If African nations are to
buy into the global economy and their populations are to support this develop-
ment, globalization will need to affect the economic potential of the poor and
raise their standard of living. To do this, a set of moral values must be developed
that will inform market values.
Have moral values had a lessening impact on market values? What sound
policies relate to moral and market values? The transactional nature of eco-
nomic life requires cooperation between the parties of economic transactions.
Cooperation by definition involves fairness and trust, which are clear moral val-
ues. There are, of course, cases where people pursue economic ends by means of
immoral and illegal means, as in the case of the slave trade. So although moral
values are not necessarily inherent in market values, we must have moral moor-
ings if our economic life is to hold together. 
The effect of moral values on market values is diminishing for historical
and contemporary reasons. Notwithstanding the Protestant church’s historical
commitment to the work ethic, market values such as competition, self-interest,
market dominance, or transactional transparency have not translated well into
the moral sphere. Among the most egregious failures of the church have been its
unwillingness to develop a moral taxonomy of competition or self-interest and
its ambiguity toward wealth creation. In the past, the church thought it “harder
for a rich man to get into heaven than for a camel to get through the eye of a nee-
dle.” Consequently the church has missed an important opportunity and has
fallen into the trap of viewing economic activity as a zero-sum game instead of
seeing its potential to enhance the commonwealth for everybody’s benefit. This
limited view has kept it from giving authoritative direction to economic develop-
ment. In addition, technology has expanded the economic universe beyond the
ethical reach of any single entity. Former Federal Reserve Bank Chairman Alan
Greenspan observed that new technologies that move and manage capital “have
challenged the ability of inward-looking and protectionist economies to main-
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tain effective barriers,” and have strained human evaluation capacities. The
result has been a market discipline that has become more draconian over the
past 30 years.
How can we reconnect market values to moral values? Market and private
enterprise, if unchecked, degenerate into a force that stifles progress, opportunity,
and growth. A free market needs to be moored to moral values if it is to remain
free, vibrant, and progressive. Market values without moral values make for an
unfair or precarious state of affairs. Developing countries are now experiencing
some of the structural moral problems that more advanced societies had to
confront and solve earlier. They should expect to receive similar benefits for
this effort.
When I was Ambassador to Tanzania, the Clinton administration tried to
integrate Africa into the global economy. In addition to specific programs for
economic and political reform in Africa, all US embassies were given implicit
instructions to be more aggressive in engaging African countries in issues of
trade and investment instead of focusing solely on aid. The Bush administration
is continuing to see Africa as the world’s last major potential emerging market
and an important aspect of overall US economic prosperity. 
The US will develop a competitive advantage if Africa decides that doing
business with the US lies in their best interest in terms of rate of return, eco-
nomic growth, and a rise in the standard of living. In other words, our competi-
tive advantage is secured by being “fair” in our economic engagements.
“Fairness” is a fundamental moral value. 
Melding market values to moral values will make us more attractive to
Africa. I do not suggest we develop a list of moral values to juxtapose with mar-
ket principles, but a principle of fairness must underlie our economic involve-
ment with developing countries. It will have to work for them as well as it does
for us. In order to deal with the discontent and despair that incubates the fanati-
cism we are presently trying to defeat, we must find the proper mixture of moral
values and market values.
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Elizabeth Prodromou
Response
Can religion help correct a fundamental failure of the market to resolve the ten-
sion between growth and equity? The problem of social justice grows extremely
urgent in an increasingly globalized marketplace. Can religions offer support
and constructive suggestions in this larger debate?
One answer is to be found in a narrow reading of the Huntingtonian civiliza-
tional model, which claims that only Protestantism and Catholicism can help
moralize the marketplace. Ambassador Stith claims to the contrary that many
religious traditions can address inequalities of the global marketplace. Alfred
Stepan argues that religions can play an important role in broadening and deep-
ening the moral discourse relating democratic values to the marketplace. We
need, however, to think about religions in the plural and to consider them all as
potentially multi-vocal.
Ambassador Stith’s distinction between moral values and market values is
somewhat problematic in distinguishing between the two, rather than assuming
a dialogue between them. Religion has become part of the global marketplace in
discursive and operational terms. When religious leaders now talk about the
competitive religious marketplace, they reveal the role they have assumed in
domestic and international public life. Religions have also begun to see how they
can act as effective agents in the marketplace. They now use mechanisms such
as mass media technologies, financial mechanisms to accumulate and redistrib-
ute wealth, etc., that were once associated with the marketplace.
Since the separation between the economic and the moral marketplace 
has collapsed, we wonder if religion has been compromised, or, to the contrary,
leaders now find themselves more in the know. How can they use their new
knowledge and expertise to resolve the tension between growth, equity, and the
problems of social justice? This overlapping is already appearing in literature on
Islamic economies, liberation theory, and, more recently, on how US foreign pol-
icy links economic assistance to human rights and freedom of conscience.
Agreements between the moral marketplace and the economic marketplace
can produce advances in equity, but they do not always do so. That leads us to
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consider regulatory structures to ensure or optimize improvement in equity and
justice. Structures that emphasize accountability and transparency, that penal-
ize corruption and the excesses of parasystemic or paralegal activity, allow
plenty of room for dialogue and for policy cooperation between the moral mar-
ketplace and the economic marketplace.
Reply by Charles Stith: 
I do not claim the church has had nothing to say about economic life, but that all
too often the church has not said the right things. The church played a critical
role in the US civil rights movement of the 1960s and liberation movements in
Africa and South and Central America. Both movements effected changes that
had profound economic implications. But, since then, it has stumbled. The most
recent initiative of significant consequence has been pushing banks to serve and
invest in marginalized communities. The $700 billion this initiative helped
make available to low- and moderate-income communities resulted in an expo-
nential growth of the middle class of this country. The church in America was
conspicuously marginal in this “movement.” On another front, while the African
church was in the vanguard relative to the continent’s liberation struggle, it has
been a backbencher in offering insight or challenges to governments and NGOs
about how to contour the new playing field and allow people to claim their stake
in their developing economies.
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Constitutionalism and the US Constitution. Values in the US Constitution
remain valid more than 200 years later; but which of them, if any, will remain
valid 200 years from now? What of constitutionalism itself—liberalism, as it
then was—the belief that the main goal of politics is to limit power. Will the
problems and opportunities of the longer-range future lead us to want to aug-
ment rather than limit power?
Fareed Zakaria
The Rise of Illiberal Democracy
Globalism and global capitalism have been around for a longer time, but democ-
racy, a new development, is the most important feature of the modern age and
colors all aspects of our age. It involves the breakdown of authority and the
movement away from large banks, trading firms, and other institutions, in favor
of empowering individuals and small groups of individuals. Evidence of this
trend is everywhere, including the democratization of technology fundamental
to the terrorism we are seeing today. On the other hand, the notion of a general
movement towards democracy includes too much. There used to be five democra-
cies in the world with an election every year or so. Now there are 120 with 25 to
30 national elections and 200–300 local ones. Democratic ideology has become
the only basis for legitimate authority throughout the world. It has assumed for-
mal dominance as a political system and an informal dominance which perme-
ates every aspect of social organization. 
I applaud this development, but would like to point out that pure democracy
untempered by anything else can be dangerous. Traditional Aristotelian con-
cepts of democracy blend with other forms of authority and institutions, but
modern democracy, to the contrary, is the sole, unchallenged occupant of politi-
cal and social space, having gone from being merely a form of government to a
way of life. Problems with this formal dominance of democracy lie at the heart 
of liberal democracy.
Some believe that once you hold elections you have established democracy. I
wish to argue that substantial issues that will not go away relate to the precondi-
tions and sequencing of that development. Let us distinguish between simple
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democracy and liberal democracy. Few countries illustrate an automatic process
of democratic procedures leading to liberalism and constitutionalism. Mexico
had been liberalizing its institutions for years before it capped the process off
with a transition to democracy, imperfect though it still is. Countries that have
not gone through a period of liberalization do not consolidate as effectively as
others that have. 
We can see a related issue in the problem of authority even in contemporary
America, the most advanced modern democracy, which is dealing with problems
that are likely to arise in other parts of the modern world. The US has seen a
noteworthy decline in trust and respect for politics, political institutions and
political authority, a process that has taken over thirty years and represents one
aspect of the radical political democratization. 
As American politics became more democratized, institutions lost authority
and standing in the eyes of the American people and became less effective,
coherent, and legitimate. Political parties are perfect examples of Aristotelian
and Tocquevillan ideas of mixed democracy. We have elections, but within that
basic framework many undemocratic elements, like political parties, operate.
Parties offer people choices that have been arrived at undemocratically. Internal
dynamics and organization of a party therefore must be governed by political
and intellectual coherence. When in the sixties and seventies we moved to an
entirely different, radically more democratic system of primaries, which were
pre-election elections, we destroyed the traditional coherence, authority, and
raison d’etre of political parties. The most important function of the party,
selecting candidates, was then transferred to the candidate who could command
the most telegenic image and financially enterprising machinery. 
A similar process of democratization that occurred in the Congressional
committee system further radically empowered 535 people. Collaborative action
thus became very difficult, and large-scale action, particularly in peacetime,
almost impossible. A very high premium has been placed on short-term oppor-
tunism and a corresponding high cost on long-term policy. The most dramatic
radicalization of democratic politics has been the rise of the referendum.
California is the frightening model of the future of American politics, in which
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referendums, financed by either millionaires or special interest groups, will
make non-negotiable demands. 
Politics is developing into a form that operates without the politicians, who
are being deprived of power, judgment, and authority. This development repre-
sents the greatest challenge facing the Western world. How can we combine the
need for an increasing degree of popular participation with the need for control
and surveillance and for internal coherence? The West’s present, unsatisfactory
solution is to delegate policy-making decisions to unelected bodies. The
European Union, the principal agent for economic deregulation and economic
growth, forces governments to adopt market-friendly rules when they prefer not
to make these choices themselves. Elected US representatives who have been
afraid to face difficult economic policies delegate power and initiative to the
Federal Reserve, which is the single most important governmental institution,
even though it is entirely unelected and accountable to no one. A similar dele-
gation of power has occurred with military policy. 
Some things have to be delegated. That is part of the Aristotelian conception
of a mixed democratic system. But democrats have to participate actively in that
process and be willing to espouse politically difficult positions. At the heart of
America’s problems is the rise of special interests that mobilize the moment they
see a measure that might threaten their interests. Madison was wrong to claim
that factions cancel each other out. 
Western democracies will have to figure out which issues can be dealt with
by delegation of power and which have to be faced head-on whatever their elec-
toral consequences. If not, the requirements of global capitalism and democratic
development will become increasingly inimical. 
My purpose here was not to bury democracy, but to save it. 
Tony Smith
Response
Fareed Zakaria’s paper discusses the dangers of democratic governments gone
wild and how leaders who emerge out of hyper-democracies usurp powers that
should be reserved to other agencies of the government or to society itself. These
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problems characterize many late democratizing nations. Zakaria’s remarks 
concentrate on the early democratizing world and its weaknesses rather than 
its strengths, emphasizing weaknesses that can arise when early democratizers
become more democratic.
When Zakaria says that while constitutional liberalism leads to democracy,
democracy does not always evince constitutional liberalism, he is pointing to
sequences in countries like Great Britain and the US, which were liberal before
they became democratic. In these terms, constitutional democracy is the weav-
ing together of two distinct traditions—liberalism and democracy—which his-
torically sometimes opposed each other but in the end led to constitutional
democracy. Many NGOs who ask authoritarian governments to enact liberal
measures are aware of this historical contradiction. Democracy and liberalism
are different ideas. Democracy may come later, or it may not. In some cases,
democracy eviscerates liberalism. But there is an affinity between the two. The
classical sequence may still be with us. 
Fareed Zakaria pointed out “the fallacy of electoralism.” I would like to
emphasize the fallacy of the fallacy of electoralism. Electoralism means more
than people turning out to vote. It involves freedom of speech and assembly, it
allows various elements of civil society to bargain with one another through
party structures, and it creates a kind of social contract that can help guide the
government. We need to broaden our notion of elections from the simple use of
the ballot to the entire process of articulating and encouraging interests through
the party system. One of the best ways to limit the excesses of democracy in the
late democratizing world is strengthening civil society and aligning various
agents of civil society with political parties. 
Multi-ethnic parties can tend to exacerbate ethnic conflicts. Nigeria has
experimented with such measures to alleviate these tensions as assuring the
representation of minorities in legislatures. Another danger is the development
of neo-fascism, which involves a highly nationalistic and militaristic cult of the
personality and one-man rule. 
The US is not the most advanced democracy, compared with Germany,
France, and the Scandinavian countries, that are not limited by an electoral
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college. They publicly fund their campaigns, thus avoiding the excessive power
of special interests. Their electoral system also encourages the formation and
growth of small parties. The US has a low voter turnout and a general sense that
popular will is not being represented. We need to look at more than the ballot
itself and concentrate more broadly on the electoral process. Democracy is
becoming weaker at the center, but we can reverse this trend.
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Director’s Summary
D I R E C T O R ’ S  S U MM A R Y
David Fromkin
The group agreed that today’s Western values are:
Democracy
Constitutionalism
Liberalism
Rule of law
Open society
Market economy.
We agreed that these were desirable, and that we would hope they would charac-
terize the world of the longer-range future. Roger Kimball made the point that
these are values under assault and that we can keep them only by defending them.
But are these values desirable in themselves? In which case, the question
will be “how is the world of the future going to achieve or maintain them?” Or are
these values desirable because they are the most effective approaches to dealing
with the sorts of conditions, issues, and problems with which the world of the
longer-range future may have to deal?
Fareed Zakaria seemed to lean rather more towards the former than the lat-
ter. For a variety of reasons that include the existence of pressure groups that
distort parliamentary voting, and the human failings that characterize the elec-
torate, the model for the future may be the European Community, in which face-
less expert technocrats make the hard decisions that electorates are not
emotionally and intellectually capable of making for themselves.
For the same reason—because legislatures and electorates cannot make the
hard decisions—democracy (which is a desirable goal) comes last in the progres-
sion of values we desire. First a society (through taking what often are hard
decisions) must find wealth and stability; only then can it achieve and maintain
a democracy.
This suggests that our current values, though they fit with one another and
are coherent, can be separated from one another. Freedom of inquiry is essential
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to the science that underlies a growth economy; and rule of law is essential to
attracting capital investment. Both bring wealth that (according to Dr. Zakaria)
must be achieved before democracy can be achieved or maintained. I would add
that a relatively widespread distribution of the wealth throughout society is, in
my view, another pre-condition.
Dr. Zakaria’s pre-democratic government, even if authoritarian, must, we
argue, pursue liberal economics. But can it do that if it does not pursue liberal
politics as well? And since liberal politics involve the rule of law, how can they be
pursued by a regime that is authoritarian, which, by definition, is not restrained
by constitutions and law? These are issues that we were still discussing when, so
to speak, the bell rang.
Sequence also was central to the paper submitted by Professor Etzioni, who
moved away from the government-and-people model to focus on a third category:
society. Instead of shaping the values of the longer-range future by moving from
one kind of government and politics to another, the sequence he proposes would
move through the processes of society before finding expression at the stage of
government and politics. There was much valuable discussion.
Ambassador Stith moved the sequence along by adding to it one dimension
more: that of morality. In his model, a moral code must move society, which then
moves politics and government. Again, the focus was on both separability and
sequence of values.
All participants seemed to be concerned with how to make liberal demo-
cratic politics work, not because they always work best (which, it was agreed,
they do not) but because they best represent our values.
But what if the circumstances of the longer-range future render liberal
democracies and open societies ineffective? Must we not curtail our liberties in
order to deal with terrorism? “Yes, temporarily, but only until the threat is over-
come,” was one reply; but what if the threat is not overcome? What if it becomes
a permanent threat? In my book, The Way of the World, I point out that the long-
range trend is for individuals and small groups to be able to do more and more
harm. If continued, and if not countered by new technologies, it will mean that
society will disintegrate as any fanatic with a mini-atom bomb will be able to
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destroy whole cities to prove a point. In other words, it may well be that our val-
ues, though valid in the sense that they remain desirable, will prove to be invalid
in the longer-range future, in the sense that they may no longer be affordable or
may not work at all. On the other hand what assurance do we have that any other
type of government would work any better?
The second Pardee workshop-conference, which will focus on the changing
political structure of the world (April 2002), is foreshadowed by my own paper on
how the need for global governance in environmental and other matters can be
met—if it can be met—in a world without global governance. I argue that the tra-
ditional American Wilsonian approach, with its emphasis on public opinion, per-
suasion, shared ideas, independence of nations, rights of small countries, and
non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries except for humanitar-
ian reasons, never worked and never will in dealing with matters that require
government. My argument is that the closest we can get to governance in envi-
ronmental and other global matters is by alliance with other countries based on
interests: interests held in common.
Four key points to consider are:
(1) Our kinds of government and politics will be as desirable in a century or
two as they are today, but they may not work as well then as they do now, and
indeed may not work at all.
(2) A strategy to establish and maintain our political values in a century or
two might have to proceed in sequence rather than all at once.
(3) Democracy may come last in that strategic sequence, and we should
focus on how to achieve it or maintain it precisely because we believe in it so
strongly and yet its future is so problematical.
(4) In considering what values to apply to the world as a whole, it is easier to
answer the question “what should be done?” than the question “who can make
and enforce the right decision as to what should be done?”
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P A R T I C I P A N T S ’  B I O G R A P H I E S
A N D  C O N T A C T  I N F O R M A T I O N
Ralph Buultjens
Professor of Social Sciences, New York University
New York University
School of Continuing and Professional Studies
10 Astor Place, 5th Floor
New York, NY 10003
Professor Buultjens is a historian, award-winning author, and Professor of Social Sciences at New York
University. He is also a member of the faculty of the New School University; former Nehru Professor and
Professorial Fellow at the University of Cambridge; former Resident of the Society for Asian Af fairs; and
Cha irman of the Internationa l Deve lopment Forum. Professor Buultjens is a recipient of the Toynbee
Prize in Socia l Sciences; was awarded the French Order of Ar ts and Letters , NYU; and New School
Teaching Awards; and has rece ived numerous honorary degrees . He is the author of many books on
world politics and history, including Windows on India, 1977–87 , The Decline of Democracy, China After
Mao, and Politics and History: Lessons for Today, and is a contributing editor of the Boston Book
Review. Professor Buultjens is a lso a frequent media commentator and has been featured on BBC,
CNN, ABC, and other networks. He also has been a consultant / advisor to the United Nations and major
international organizations.
James Chace
Professor of Government and Public Law, Bard College (deceased 2005)
James Chace was one of America’s leading foreign policy historians and analysts. After studying litera-
ture, French, and Italian at Harvard, he served as an Army translator in France, and developed an inter-
est in fore ign policy. Chace wrote for Esquire , East Europe , and Interplay, among others , and was an
editor for several influential foreign policy journals, including Foreign Af fairs and World Policy Journal. He
was also a frequent contributor to the New York Review of Books. The author of nine books, he is best
remembered for his biography of Dean Acheson, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the
American World (1998). He served as a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace in Washington, and was awarded a Chevalier des Ar ts et Lettres from the French Government. 
He taught at Bard College in Annandale-on-Hudson, New York.
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Mark D. Danner
Professor of Journalism, University of California-Berkeley
Graduate School of Journalism
University of California at Berkeley
121 Northgate Hall 94720-5860
E-mail: mark@markdanner.com
Mark Danner is a writer, journalist, and professor who has written for more than two decades on foreign
af fairs and international conflict. He has written extensively about the development of American foreign
policy during the late Cold War and afterward, and about violations of human rights during that time .
Danner is a longtime staf f writer for The New Yorker and a regular contributor to The New York Review 
of Books.
Born and raised in Utica and in the Adirondack mountains, Danner graduated from Harvard College,
magna cum laude, in June 1981 . He joined The New Yorker’s staf f in 1990 , and in the 1990s was
widely recognized for his repor ting on Central America and the Balkans. 
In 1998 , Danner began teaching at the University of California at Berkeley as a visiting professor at 
the Graduate School of Journalism and Senior Research Fellow at the Human Rights Center. In 2000 ,
Danner was named Professor on the faculty of the Graduate School of Journalism at Berkeley. He cur-
rently spends half his year at Berkeley, where he teaches courses on political violence, crisis manage-
ment in international af fairs, and writing about wars and politics. In fall 2002 , he became founding
director of Berkeley’s Goldman Forum on the Press and Foreign Af fairs, leading a series of debates and
discussions on foreign af fairs, journalism, and politics. In 2002 , Danner was named Henry R. Luce
Professor of Human Rights and Journalism at Bard College in the Hudson Valley of New York State. 
Danner’s work has been honored with a National Magazine Award, three Overseas Press Awards, and
an Emmy. In June 1999 , Danner was named a MacAr thur Fellow. Mark Danner serves on the board of
the World Af fairs Council of Nor thern California and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations,
the Pacific Council on International Policy, and the Century Association, and is a fellow of the Institute 
of the Humanities at New York University. Danner divides his time between San Francisco and New York.
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Amitai Etzioni
Director, Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies; University Professor and Professor of International
Affairs, George Washington University 
The Communitarian Network
George Washington University
2130 H Street, NW, Suite 703
Washington, DC 20052
E-mail: etzioni@gwu.edu
After receiving his Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of California-Berkeley, Amitai Etzioni served as
a Professor of Sociology at Columbia University for 20 years—par t of that time as the chairman of the
depar tment. He was a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution before serving as a senior advisor to
the White House on domestic af fa irs . Etzioni was named the first University Professor at The George
Washington University, where he is the director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies. He has
served as the Thomas Henry Carroll Ford Foundation Professor at the Harvard Business School, the
president of the American Sociological Association, and was the founding president of the international
Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics. In 1990 , he founded the Communitarian Network, a
not-for-profit, non-par tisan organization dedicated to shoring up the moral, social, and political founda-
tions of society. He was the editor of The Responsive Community: Rights and Responsibilities, the orga-
nization’s quar terly journal, from 1991 to 2004 . 
Etzioni is the author of twenty-four books, including The Monochrome Society, The Limits of Privacy, The
New Golden Rule, which received the Simon Wiesenthal Center’s 1997 Tolerance Book Award, The Spirit
of Community, and The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics. His most recent books are My
Brother’s Keeper: A Memoir and a Message, and From Empire to Community: A New Approach to
International Relations.
In 2001 , Etzioni was named among the top 100 American intellectuals as measured by academic 
citations in Richard Posner’s book, Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline. Also in 2001 , Etzioni was
awarded the John P. McGovern Award in Behavioral Sciences as well as the Of ficer’s Cross of the Order
of Merit of the Federa l Republic of Germany. He was a lso the recipient of the seventh James Wilbur
Award for Extraordinary Contributions to the Appreciation and Advancement of Human Va lues by the
Conference on Value Inquiry, as well as the Sociological Practice Association’s Outstanding Contribution
Award.
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David Fromkin
Director, Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future; Frederick S. Pardee
Professor of Future Studies; University Professor; Professor of International Relations, of History, and of
Law, Boston University
Boston University
67 Bay State Road
Boston, MA 02215
E-mail: fromkin@bu.edu
Professor Fromkin served for three years as a First Lieutenant in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps,
United States Army, stationed in Verdun, France, where he was a trial observer in French cour ts pur-
suant to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. As prosecutor and defense counsel, he fought more
than one hundred contested cour ts mar tial. He began his civilian career as an associate of the Wall
Street law firm of Simpson, Thacher & Bar tlett. After a varied career in law, business, and politics, he
turned to writing works of history and studies of world politics. His shor ter pieces have appeared in
Foreign Af fairs, the New York Times, and other publications. He is the author of seven books, including
the national bestseller A Peace to End All Peace (1989), chosen by the editors of the New York Times
Book Review as one of the dozen best books of the year and shor tlisted for the Pulitzer Prize . His
most recent book, published in March 2004 , is Europe’s Last Summer: Who Star ted the Great War in
1914? He has been a member of the Council on Foreign Relations since 1976 .
Professor Fromkin is also the Director of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-
Range Future and the Center’s first Frederick S . Pardee Professor of Future Studies . In addition,
Professor Fromkin holds appointments as a Univers ity Professor and Professor of Interna tiona l
Relations, of History, and of Law. He served three years as the director of the Center for International
Relations and chairman of the Depar tment of International Relations at Boston University. 
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Erik Goldstein
Professor of International Relations, Boston University
Boston University
Department of International Relations
152 Bay State Road, Room 330
Boston, MA 02215
E-mail: goldstee@bu.edu
Professor Goldstein’s research interests include diplomacy, formulation of national diplomatic strate-
gies, the origins and resolution of armed conflict, and negotiation. He has published in numerous jour-
nals. He is the author of Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris
Peace Conference, 1916–1920; Wars and Peace Treaties; The First World War’s Peace Settlements:
International Relations, 1918–1925; and Power and Stability: British Foreign Policy, 1865–1965 . He has
co-edited The End of the Cold War; The Washington Conference, 1921–1922: Naval Rivalry, East Asian
Stability, and the Road to Pearl Harbor; The Munich Crisis: New Interpretations and the Road to World
War II; and Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy. Professor Goldstein is also the founder-
editor of the journal Diplomacy & Statecraft, and he serves on the editorial board of Byzantine and
Modern Greek Studies.
He is a Fe llow of the Roya l Historica l Society of Brita in and a member of the Advisory Board of the
Centre for the Study of Diplomacy at the University of Le icester (UK). He was previously Professor of
Internationa l History and Deputy Director for the Centre for Studies in Security and Diplomacy at the
University of Birmingham (UK) and has he ld appointments as Secretary of the Navy Senior Research
Fe llow at the Nava l War College and as Visiting Scholar at the Centre for Internationa l Studies at the
University of Cambridge. He is the President of Phi Beta Kappa, Epsilon of Massachusetts. He has been
the recipient of numerous grants and accolades, including the Wardrop Fund Grant at the University of
Oxford, a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Bane Fund Grant from Cambridge University,
and a Hoover Presidential Library Fellowship.
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Robert Jackson
Professor of International Relations and of Political Science, Boston University
Boston University
Department of International Relations
154 Bay State Road, Room 303
Boston, MA 02215
E-mail: rjackson@bu.edu
Professor Jackson specializes in international ethics, international law, and the history of international
thought. He has been a Visiting Fe llow at Jesus College (Oxford University), the London School of
Economics, the Hoover Institution (Stanford University), and the University of California at Berkeley. He
has lectured at universities in Nor th America, Europe, and Africa and has served on university and gov-
ernment consultancies in Brita in, Canada , and Denmark. He a lso serves on the editoria l boards of
Political Studies, International Relations, European Journal of International Relations, and Humanistic
Perspectives on International Relations. He has won major Canada Council and Killam Foundation of
Canada research prizes and fellowships. Professor Jackson is an author or editor of ten books, including
Classica l and Modern Thought on Internationa l Re lations , The Globa l Covenant, Sovere ignty at the
Millennium, Quasi-States, and Personal Rule in Black Africa. He has co-authored a widely adopted text-
book: Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches. He has published in leading
international journals, including World Politics, International Organization, Political Studies, Review of
International Studies, Millennium, and Diplomacy & Statecraft. 
Roger Kimball
Managing Editor, The New Criterion
Roger Kimball is Managing Editor of The New Criterion and an ar t critic for the London Spectator. He is
also a frequent contributor to the Wall Street Journal, the London Times Literary Supplement, Literary
Review, New York Times Book Review, and other magazines. He received degrees from Bennington
College and Ya le Univers ity, and has taught a t Ya le and Connecticut College . His books include
Experiments Against Reality: The Fate of Culture in the Postmodern Age, The Long March: How the
Cultural Revolution of the 1960s Changed America, and Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has Corrupted
Our Higher Education. In addition, Kimball serves on the Board of Visitors and Governors of St. John’s
College, Annapolis and Santa Fe, on the Board of Advisors at Gilder-Lehrman Institute of American
History, and on the board of The National Center for the Study of Civic Literacy.
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Joachim Maître
Director, Military Education; Director, Center for Defense Journalism; Chairman, Department of
International Relations; Professor of Journalism and of International Relations, Boston University
Boston University
152 Bay State Road, Room 110
Boston, MA 02215
E-mail: yomaitre@bu.edu
Professor Maître has served in a variety of academic and journalism positions in Nor th America, Europe,
and Africa. He has been a lecturer for the University of Nigeria, a freelance correspondent and editor for
Die Welt, chairman and associate professor of German at McGill University, the editor of Die Welt des
Buches, a press and olympic attaché for the Olympic Games of 1976 , and editor-in-chief of Die Welt am
Sontag, the Axel Springer Verlag, and the Ullstein Buchverlag. He is a specialist both in security af fairs
and in repor ting on security af fa irs , and teaches in the College of Communication’s Depar tment of
Journalism as well as in International Relations. He is the founder and Director of Boston University’s
Center for Defense Journalism, and is the editor of the Center’s journal, Defense Media Review. He is
also the Director of the Division of Military Education, which oversees Boston University’s Reserve
Of ficer Training Corps (ROTC) programs.
He is a member of the Mont Pellerin Society, the Philadelphia Society, and the PEN American Center.
Lance Morrow
University Professor; Professor of Journalism, College of Communication; Adjunct Professor of English,
College of Arts and Sciences, Boston University
Boston University
University Professors Program
745 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
E-mail: lmorrow2@bu.edu
Professor Morrow has been an essayist, senior writer, and editor at Time for 35 years, and continues to
contribute to the magazine. He does a twice-weekly column on TIME.com and also writes for the New
York Times Book Review, Smithsonian, and other publications . Professor Morrow won the Nationa l
Magazine Award for Essay and Criticism in 1981 , was a fina list for the Nationa l Magazine Award in
1991 , and shared a Nationa l Magazine Award in 2001 for his essay on September 11 . William F.
Buckley has described him as “one of the two or three best writers in America.” He is the author of two
memoirs, The Chief (1986) and Hear t (1995), and several collections of essays, including Fishing in the
Tiber (1988) and Safari (1992).
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Elizabeth Prodromou
Associate Director of the Institute on Culture, Religion, and World Affairs; Assistant Professor of
International Relations, Boston University
Department of International Relations
154 Bay State Road, Room 304
Boston, MA 02215
E-mail: ehpk@bu.edu
Professor Prodromou has published widely in academic and policy journals. She is currently working on
a book on Or thodox Christianity in American Public Life: The Challenges and Oppor tunities of Religious
Pluralism in the 21st Century, as well as a volume on Or thodox Christianity, Democracy and Markets in
Post-Communist Russia . A regiona l exper t on Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean,
Prodromou’s scholarship and policy work concentrate on religion and international relations, nationalism
and conflict resolution, and non-traditional security threats. Dr. Prodromou has been an invited policy
consultant at the U.S. State Depar tment, the Fore ign Af fa irs Tra ining Center of the Fore ign Service
Institute, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Council, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, and the Council on
Foreign Relations. She has received numerous awards and grants, including research fellowships from
Harvard Univers ity’s Kennedy School of Government and Center for European Studies; New York
University’s Center for European Studies; and Princeton University’s University Committee on Research
in Humanities and Social Sciences. Prodromou was the founding Executive Director of the Cambridge
Foundation for Peace, a nonprofit organization dedicated to sustainable peace building in Southeastern
Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. She is active and has held elected positions in many profes-
sional organizations, and she is listed in Who’s Who of American Women, 21st Edition of Outstanding
Women of Nor th America.
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Joel Rosenthal
President, Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs
Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs
170 East 64th Street
New York, NY 10021-7496
E-mail: jrosenthal@cceia.org
Joel H. Rosenthal has been president of the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Af fairs since
1995 . Rosenthal received his Ph.D. from Yale University and B.A. from Harvard University. Rosenthal lec-
tures and writes frequently on ethics, U.S. foreign policy, and international relations. Under his direction,
the Carnegie Council sponsors educational programs for the worldwide audience. Recent par tners in
this work include the Na tiona l Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), the Interna tiona l Studies
Associa tion (ISA), the Oxford Centre for Applied Ethics , and the Shangha i Interna tiona l Studies
University, among many others. His publications include Ethics and International Af fairs: A Reader and
Righteous Realists.
Among his current professional activities, Rosenthal is editor-in-chief of the journal Ethics & International
Af fairs, and has oversight responsibilities for the Council’s main projects on ethics and armed conflict
with conflict prevention; comparative human rights; justice and the world economy; environmental policy;
and the politics of reconciliation. Rosenthal also serves as Adjunct Professor in the Depar tment of
Politics at New York University.
John Silber
President Emeritus; University Professor; Professor of Philosophy, of International Relations, and of Law,
Boston University
Office of the President Emeritus
Boston University
73 Bay State Road
Boston, MA 02215
After teaching at Yale, Dr. John Silber returned to Texas, where he joined the depar tment of philosophy
at the University of Texas at Austin. After serving as chairman of his depar tment he became Dean of
the College of Ar ts and Sciences.
He was the first chairman of the Texas Society to Abolish Capital Punishment and a leader in the inte-
gration of the University of Texas. Dr. Silber is a leading spokesman for the maintenance of high aca-
demic standards and has gained national attention for his advocacy of a rational, comprehensive
system for financing higher education. He was instrumental in founding Operation Head Star t.
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In January 1971 John Silber became the seventh president of Boston University, and in 1996 he became
Chancellor. In January 1996 , Governor William Weld chose Dr. Silber to head the Massachusetts Board
of Education, the state’s policy-making board for public education below the collegiate level.
Dr. Silber has written wide ly on philosophy (especia lly on Immanue l Kant), education, and socia l and
foreign policy. His works include: The Ethical Significance of Kant’s Religion, Being and Doing: A Study of
Status Responsibility and Voluntary Responsibility, Human Action and the Language of Volition, Procedural
Formalism in Kant’s Ethics, The Natural Good and the Moral Good in Kant’s Ethics, and Obedience to
the Unenforceable . His book Stra ight Shooting: Wha t ’s Wrong With America and How to Fix It, was
published in 1989 . Dr. Silber has also served as an editor of Kant-Studien, and has been the recipient
of Fulbright, Guggenheim, and ACLS Fellowships.
Tony Smith
Cornelia M. Jackson Professor of Political Science, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 
Tufts University
Tufts University
Political Science Department
Medford, MA 02155
E-mail: tony.smith@tufts.edu
Professor Smith has been at Tufts since 1970 . He became the Corne lia M. Jackson Professor of
Political Science in 1990 , and for several years served as Depar tment Chair in Political Science. He is
also a core member of the International Relations Program.
Tony Smith’s books include The French Stake in Algeria, The Pattern of Imperialism, Thinking Like a
Communist, America’s Mission: The U.S. and the Global Struggle for Democracy in the 20th Century,
and Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy. His
work has been published in World Politics, Political Theory, International Organization, Foreign Af fairs,
and French Politics and Society. 
He has held grants from the Lehrman Institute, the Rockefeller Foundation, the German Marshall Fund,
and the Woodrow Wilson Center. He was the Whitney Shepardson Fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations in 1998 and was a Fulbright Professor in Guatemala, Spring 2000 .
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Ambassador Charles Stith
Director, African Presidential Archives and Research Center, Boston University
Boston University
African Presidential Archives and Research Center
141 Bay State Road
Boston, MA 02215
E-mail: crstith@bu.edu
The Reverend Charles R. Stith is the director of the African Presidential Archives and Research Center 
at Boston University. A former United States ambassador to the Republic of Tanzania , he is a lso the
founder and former nationa l president of the Organization for the New Equa lity (ONE). His tenure as
ambassador star ted one month after the August 1998 bombing of the United States embassy in Dar es
Sa laam and he is credited with leading the embassy through its recovery. After his time in Tanzania ,
Stith founded the African Presidential Archives and Research Center (APARC) at Boston University. Stith
has received a number of awards and special appointments in his career, including an honorary doctor-
ate from his alma mater, Baker University. Also, in 1994 , President Clinton appointed Stith to the of ficial
delegation to monitor the South African election. In 2001 former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle
appointed him to the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom.
Fareed Zakaria 
Editor, Newsweek International
Fareed Zakaria is editor of Newsweek International, and he writes a column that appears in the national
edition of Newsweek, Newsweek International, and often the Washington Post.
He is the author of The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (April 2003), a book
on globa l politica l trends , and From Wea lth to Power, a provocative examination of America’s role on
the world stage. He is co-editor of The American Encounter: The United States and the Making of the
Modern World.
Zakaria was born in India, has a B.A. from Yale University (in history) and a Ph.D. from Harvard (in inter-
nationa l re lations). In 1992 , at the age of 28 , Zakaria became managing editor of Fore ign Af fa irs , the
leading journal of international politics and economics—a position he held through 2000 . He frequently
appears as a political analyst on several ABC News programs and other international news shows. 
Zakaria has written for the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and The New Yorker, and was the wine
columnist for Slate. He is the recipient of numerous awards, including the Overseas Press Club Award,
the National Press Club’s Edwin Hood Award, the Deadline Club Award for Best Columnist, and a lifetime
achievement award from the South Asian Journalists Association.
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